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INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 2017 the Plaintiff — Appellant — Cross Respondent, Donna Taylor
("Donna") 1, by and through her counsel of record, Roderick Bond, filed with this Court an
extensive and incoherent appeal stemming from two (2) cases filed in the District Court of
Nez Perce County in which she seeks the redemption of the remainder of her Series A
preferred shares in AIA Services Corporation. In response, AIA Services Corporation
("AIA"), R. John Taylor ("John"), Connie Taylor Henderson ("Connie"), James Beck
("Beck"), and Michael Cashman Sr. ("Cashman") 2 filed a brief in reply addressing the issues
presented by Donna and raising issues of their own on Cross-Appeal. In response to the issues
raised by the Defendants, Donna responded with a lengthy regurgitation of facts she has not
yet proven and a muddled reply to the issues presented, to which the Defendants now respond.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Donna, while making various unfounded accusations of malfeasance against the
Defendants, ultimately argues that this Court should either: (1) enforce an illegal contract
for her benefit or (2) leave her in the position in which the Court finds her. (Appellant's Br.
at 1-56.) Donna believes this position to be in the possession of 41,651.25 shares of AIA
Services Corporation stock for a total value of $416,512.50. Id. In response to the issues

'Various parties will be referred to by their first names to avoid confusion as there are multiple parties involved in
this case with the last name "Taylor."
2
Individual Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants collectively will be referred to as "individual
defendants" where appropriate. Where appropriate, AIA and the Individual Defendants will be collectively
referred to as "Defendants."
1

1

presented by Donna on appeal, the Defendants argued that the contract Donna seeks to
inforce is illegal and unenforceable and that this Court should leave her in the position
where it finds her; holding 7,110 shares of Series A Preferred stock in AIA Services
Corporation at an interest rate of prime less 1 1/ 2%. Further, the Defendants maintain that
those shares may only be redeemed from legally available funds to the extent that the
redemption does not violate the Idaho Business Corporations Act. (Respt's Br. at 6.)
Additionally, in their reply, the Defendants raised three (3) issues on Cross Appeal: (1) that the District Court erred when it ruled that Donna's claims of breach of
fiduciary duty were not barred by the economic loss rule; (2) that the District Court erred
when it ruled that Donna's reverse subordination agreement was not a breach of contract;
and (3) that the Defendants are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. (Respt's Br. at 9.) In
an attempted response to the issues Donna, through a lengthy introduction and
regurgitation of the facts as she perceives them to be, argues that: (1) the contract she
seeks to enforce is illegal and unenforceable and as a result, she could not have breached
said contract; (2) that because Donna's lacks a post-secondary education, she deserves a
special status regarding her claims under the economic loss rule; and (3) D onna is entitled
to attorney's fees.
III. RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because this brief is in rebuttal to Donna's Cross-Respondent's brief in reply, the
Defendants object to Donna's "Response to 'Statement of the Facts — pursuant to I.A.R.
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35(b)(3). The Defendants maintain that the Statement of Facts contained within their
Respondent's Brief is an accurate reflection of the facts of this case and incorporate
within this brief those facts. 3As such, the Defendants will address the purported issues raised
by Donna regarding those facts in turn.
First, Donna maintains that her shares in AIA were not issued as result of her
divorce from Reed, but rather as an altruistic loan from Donna to AIA for $2,000,000.00.
(Cross Respt's Br. at 3.) To prove this Donna cites to the Property Settlement Agreement
("PSA") she entered into with her ex-husband, Reed Taylor, which divided their
community property in a manner by which Reed pursuant to their dissolution (R. 533-65.)
Donna also cites to AIA Income Reports that show both the gross revenues of AIA and
its subsidiaries and their respective Net Incomes. (R. 3569-70.) However, neither
document shows a loan by Donna to AIA. Rather, Donna's divorce settlement shows that
Reed conveyed all of his interest in preferred shares of AIA to Donna. (R. 562.)
Additionally, the Income Statements, cited by Donna, show that between 1995 through
2013, A1A's net income averaged $102,531.94 per year; a far cry from the "cash cow"
Donna purports AIA and its subsidiaries to be. (R. 3569-70.) Thus, Donna's shares in
ALA came to her through her divorce settlement with Reed Taylor, as de facto alimony,
and not the product of a loan given to AIA by Donna.

In the interest of brevity and consideration for the Court's time, the Defendants incorporate their Statement of Facts
provided previously to the Court in their Respondent's Brief and specifically address the issues raised by Donna in
her Cross-Respondent's brief section entitled "Response to 'Statement of Facts'."
3
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Second, Donna believes that the amended and restated opinion of a witness who was
paid to review her self-serving affidavits, the affidavits of her attorney, and her memoranda
in support of her position in different stages of this matter, are definitive proof that AIA
had the funds to keep up its redemption payments to her in 1998, therefore ALA should
have had funds in2008 to continue redeeming her shares. In 1998, according to the AIA Income
Reports cited by Donna, AIA had a net loss of $475,246. (R. 3569-70.)
However, in 2008 AIA no longer had legally available funds to keep paying for Reed
and Donna's divorce settlement. (R. 533-65; 2376.) Between 1995 and 2008 AIA and its
subsidiaries had a total net loss of $2,902,016.00. (R. 2376.). Donna purports that AIA had
income, after her expert's adjustments, of $1,489,782 for years 1995 to 2008. (R.3569-70.)
However, during these years ALA managed to pay Donna over $2.5 million dollars in
redemption payments, averaging $178,888.50 a year ($293,985.00 in 1998 alone) and pay
Reed $9.7 million dollars, averaging $693,526 a year. (R. 2376.) In either case, the payments
to Reed and Donna far exceeded net income, even according to the AIA Income Reports cited
by Donna. Therefore, Donna's assertion that AIA had funds available for the redemption of
her shares in 1998, therefore it had funds to redeem her shares in 2008 is unfounded and
illogical.
Lastly, again Donna relies on a self-serving witness who relies on Donna's "numerous
documents" produced in this case, without stating what documents were actually relied upon,
to show the intentions of John, Connie, Beck, and Cashman regarding AIA. (R. 2850-72.)
However, the unsupported statements are insufficient to show that (1) AIA was able to pay
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Donna after 2008, and (2) that the documents relied upon by the witness were, in fact,
documents pertaining to and produced in this matter. Additionally, Donna postulates that the
clandestine Reverse Subordination Agreement ("RSA") between herself and Reed would not
have been necessary had she and Reed been paid. (Cross-Respt's Br. at 4.) However, Donna
entered into the RSA in 2006, a year in which she was paid $120,000.00 and Reed was paid
$245,999.00 in redemption payments. (R. 461; 2376.) Further, the RSA was concealed by
Donna and Reed as AIA was made aware of its existence only when Reed filed suit
against law firms and attorneys associated with AIA in Ada County and King County,
Washington. (R. 2794-95.) By the time AIA was made aware of the RSA, it had already
paid Donna more than $175,000.00 in redemption payments to which she was not
entitled, pursuant to her own agreement. (R.2376; 2794.) Therefore, Donna's issues
again, are unfounded.
IV.

RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL

The Defendants restate the following issues on Cross-Appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 35(6)(4):
I. Did the District Court err in ruling Donna Taylor's breach
of fiduciary duty claim are not bared by the economic loss
rule?
2. Did the District Court err in ruling Donna's reverse

subordination agreement was not a breach of contract?

3. Are the respondents —cross-appellants entitled to an award of

attorney's fees on appeal?
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V. ARGUMENT
In her Appellant's Reply, Donna attempts a rebuttal to the points raised by the
Defendants in their Respondent's Brief in Reply with another lengthy and convoluted
regurgitation of the same arguments presented in her Appellant's Brief Donna next
endeavors a response to the issues presented on Cross-Appeal by the Defendants to which
the Defendants now provide this rebuttal.
A. The District Court erred in holding that Donna's claims of breach of
contract were not barred by the Economic Loss Rule.
On Cross-Appeal, the Defendants argued that Donna's only remedy in this case is the
redemption of her remaining 7,110 shares in ALA because the Economic Loss Rule precludes
her claims of breach of fiduciary duty. (Respt's Br. at 35.) This argument is based on
various jurisdictions' "common sense" approach to economic loss rule in relation to claims
of breach of fiduciary duty. (Respt's Br. at 35.) When a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
is: (1) inextricably intertwined with breach of contract claims; or (2) when a plaintiff seeks
only the benefit of a contract, those claims are precluded by the economic loss rule. Action
Nissan, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (M.D. Fla. 2008);
BlackRock Allocation Target Shares: Series S Portfolio v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
2017 WL 1194683, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017)(internal citations omitted).
In response, Donna argues, albeit incorrectly, that the District Court did not err and
that the Economic Loss Rule does not bar her claim of breach of contract for the following
reasons: (1) MA is raising this issue for the first time on appeal; (2) the RSA entered into
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by Donna and Reed was illegal and she could not have breached an illegal contract; (3)
Donna had the right to enter into the illegal RSA because she was the only beneficiary to
the RSA; and (4) ALA materially breached its Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement
("PSA") and the 1995 Letter Agreements and as such, she was entitled to enter into the
RSA (and avoid breach of contract claims against her.) The Defendants respond in turn.
i.

AIA was not required to make a breach of contract claim
specifically relating to the 1995 Letter Agreements.

First, AIA is not raising a breach of contract claim for the first time via its CrossAppeal. In response to the lawsuit filed by Donna against it, AIA counterclaimed for
breach of the PSA, a contract, between Donna and AIA. (R. 60 -61.) However, it was not
necessary for AIA to raise a specific counterclaim as to the 1995 Letter Agreements
because those agreements were operative documents memorialized in a 1995 redemption
agreement; an agreement she agrees is invalid. (R.2425.) Additionally, the Court correctly
ruled that the 1995 redemption agreement, to which the January 11, 1995 letter was a
precursor, were superseded and/or replaced by the 1996 PSA. (R. 2425) The court correctly
rules that the 1995 agreement was superseded because AIA shareholders did not approve
of paying a higher interest rate for the redemption of Donna's shares, an interest rate which
was negotiated in 1995 Letter Agreements. (R. 3349.).
Further, the 1995 series of letters were memorialized in a 1995 redemption
agreement, which Donna agrees was illegal. (R. 2425.) She now argues that one specific
letter in that series is enforceable while admitting that only two of the three letters in the

7

series were signed by necessary parties. (Cross-Respt's Br. at 18; R. 2426.) However, those
letters are barred by the Parol Evidence Rule. The Parol Evidence Rule simply states that
"[w]here preliminary negotiations are consummated by written agreement; the writing
supersedes all previous understandings and the intent of the parties must be ascertained
from the writing." Valley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 498, 808 P.2d 415 (1991).
Further, this rule applies only when the integrated character of the writing is established.
Whether a particular subject of negotiations is embodied in the writing depends on the
intent of the parties, revealed by their conduct and language, and by the surrounding
circumstances. Nysingh v. Warren, 94 Idaho 384, 385, 488 P.2d 355, 356 (1971).
In this case, the Defendants have maintained that the three (3) letters signed in
1995 were memorialized in one document in 1995, which Donna subsequently agreed was
illegal and unenforceable, and that the use of those prior letter agreements would be
contrary to the intent of the parties. (R. 2425-26.) As such, it has been and remains the
Defendants' position that the 1995 letters cannot be reanimated to impose a valid
contractual obligation as those letters are parol evidence and not a valid and enforceable
contract in and of themselves. Thus, the Defendants were not required to make a breach
of contract claim specifically regarding the 1995 Letter Agreements.
Second, Donna argued in her Appellant's Brief that the illegal portions of the PSA
pertaining to Reed should be severed and that the portions pertaining to her should be
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enforced. 4 (Appellant's Br. at 22.) Conversely, Donna then admits that the PSA is illegal
and unenforceable as it pertains to her but the Court should apply various exceptions under
the illegality doctrine. 5 (Cross-Respt's Br. at 10 - 14.) Shortly thereafter, Donna argues that
the PSA is illegal and as a result, she could not have breached an illegal agreement. (CrossRespt's Br. at 34.) Presumably she bases this argument on the District Court's postulation of
the "no taint" rule which essentially states that a legal and valid contract is not voided by a
subsequent illegal contract regarding the same matter. (R.2426.) Although the District Court
found this persuasive, there is no such precedent in Idaho. (R. 2426.) Further, the success of
that argument is predicated on the existence of an underlying legal and valid contract. Tillman
v. Talbert, 244 N.C. 270, 93 S.E.2d 101 (1956). As such, Donna wishes to argue, when it is
seemingly beneficial for her to do so, that the PSA is illegal and unenforceable. Conversely,
when it fits her narrative, Donna argues that the PSA is a valid and enforceable contract to
which the parties should be bound.
B. The District Court erred in holding that Donna's claims of breach of
fiduciary duties were not barred by the Economic Loss Rule.

On Cross-Appeal, the Defendants argued that Donna's only remedy in this case is the
redemption of her remaining 7,110 shares in AIA because the Economic Loss Rule precludes

Donna admits that the PSA is "...illegal and unenforceable as to Donna, Reed, and AlA Services...and the
provisions regarding Reed should be severed. Thus, the Agreement should be enforced." (Appellant's Br. at 22.)
She then states "...a court may sever the illegal portions of an agreement and enforce the non-illegal portions."
(Appellant's Br. at 22.)
5
Thus, Donna argues that the portions of the PSA pertaining to her are legal and enforceable in their own right.
She then argues that the PSA should be enforced under the illegality doctrine, a remedy available for contracts
that are illegal and unenforceable. (Appellant's Br. at 23.)
4
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her claims of breach of fiduciary duty. (Respt's Br. at 35.) This argument is based on various
jurisdictions' "common sense" approach to economic loss rule in relation to claims of breach
of fiduciary duty. (Respt's Br. at 35.) When a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is: (1)
inextricably intertwined with breach of contract claims; or (2) when a plaintiff seeks only the
benefit of a contract, those claims are precluded by the economic loss rule. Action Nissan,
Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (M.D. Fla. 2008); BlackRock
Allocation Target Shares: Series S. Portfolio v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 2017 WL
1194683, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017) (intemal citations omitted).
In response, Donna argues, albeit incorrectly, that the District Court did not err and
that the Economic Loss Rule does not bar her claim of breach of fiduciary duties for the
following reasons: (1) the issue exceeds the scope of this appeal; (2) Donna's claim is
based on intentional tort and not negligence; (3) the individual Defendants owed fiduciary
duties to Donna via statutory and common law; (4) the Court should make a unique
exception for Donna in this case; (5) Donna is not required to pursue breach of fiduciary
duty claims in a derivative action; and (6) the economic loss rule cannot apply in this case
as there is no valid and enforceable agreement between the parties.(Cross -Respt's Br. 3639.) The Defendants respond in turn.
i.

Donna admits that most of the arguments she presents
are outside the scope allowable on appeal.

In her Appellant's Brief; most of Donna's various arguments are comprised of issues
not available to her on appeal. (R. 3438-41.); Taylor v. AIA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552.
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573-74, 261 P.3d 829, 850-51 (2011). Knowing that most of her arguments were outside
the scope allowable on appeal, Donna asks this Court to override its prior precedent and
allow her to appeal the District Court's denial of her motion for partial summary judgment
after the entry of final judgment. (Appellant's Br. at 38.) As such, in the event the Court
agreed with Donna and overruled its prior precedent, the Defendants addressed those
arguments and presented their own in their Respondent's Brief in Reply. (Respt's Br. 1-42.)
Naturally, the Defendants respectfully ask that if the Court elects to overrule its prior
precedent, that it also does the same for the Defendants and review the issues they present
outside the scope of final judgment. However, the Defendants maintain that this Court should
follow precedent and disallow the issues presented by Donna and themselves that are outside the
scope of this appeal. (Respt's Br. at 10.)
ii.

Donna argues that both intentional and unintentional torts are
barred by the Economic Loss Rule

Donna argues that her breach of fiduciary duty claims are based on intentional tort
and not on negligence and as a result, are not barred by the economic loss rule. (Cross Respt's Br. at 36.) Most often the economic loss rule applies to negligence cases. Rarnerth
v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194. 197, 983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999). The individual Defendants maintain
that Donna's breach of fiduciary duty claims are tantamount to a breach of contract claim.
However, Donna argues that under Idaho law, the economic loss rule applies only applies
to claims of negligence however; Donna does not rely on Idaho law to make this claim.
(Cross-Respt's Br. at 30; 36) Rather, she relies on a federal case from the District of Nevada
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which does state that, in Nevada, the district court does not dismiss intentional torts under
the economic loss rule. FLS Tramp. Servs. (USA) Inc. r Casillas, No. 3:17-cv-00013-MMDVPC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150741 (D. Nev. Sep. 18, 2017); (Cross-Respt's Br. at 36.)
Curiously however, Donna failed to state the ruling in that case in its entirety. In the district
of Nevada, the economic loss rule does bar intentional torts that "...duplicate breach of
contract claim." Id at 13. Further, the court in that case stated that the economic loss rule
bars unintentional torts [negligence claims] when the plaintiff seeks pure economic loss. Id
at 12. Thus, by her own admission, Donna argues that the economic loss rule does in fact
bar her claim, whether she argues the individual defend ants committed intentional or
unintentional torts as her claims for breach of fiduciary amount to a breach of contract
claim.
This analysis also applies to Donna's sixth (6 th ) argument that if this Court is
inclined to rule that neither 1995 letters nor the 1996 PSA are enforceable, then the
economic loss rule will not apply to her claims because there is no contract between the
parties. ((Cross-Respt's Br. at 39.) Donna argues that her claims are based in intentional
tort law and not negligence. However, it is the case, as stated above, that the economic
loss rule will bar her negligence claim or intentional tort claim. This is because she seeks
damages under breach of contract under the guise of tort law. As such, her argument t hat
if there is no contract between the parties, then her tort claims are not barred by the
economic loss rule are erroneous.
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iii.

While it is the case that Fiduciary duties arise out of Idaho and
common law, Donna only seeks a benefit of a contract and
as a result, the Economic Loss Rule Applies.

Additionally, although a corporate director's fiduciary duties arise from Idaho
statutory and common law, Donna alleges that the individual defendants owed her fiduciary
duties as a result of their contractual obligations to her under the PSA. (R. 16 -17, p. 25;
3370.) As such, the breaches of fiduciary duties Doima alleges stem from the PSA, a
contract, and are barred by the economic loss rule as those claims are inextricably
intertwined with her claim for breach of contract as she is seeking only the benefit of a
contract. Action Nissan, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (M.D. Fla.
2008); BlackRock Allocation Target Shares: Series S. Portfolio v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l
ASS'17, 2017 WL 1194683, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017)(internal citations omitted).
Thus, because Donna is only seeking the benefit of a contract, the economic loss rule
applies.
iv.

There exists no unique circumstance or special relationship in
this case for this Court to entertain a divergence from its prior
precedent.

Fourth, Donna argues that because the individual defendants at various times were
board members and/or directors and shareholders of A1A, that there existed a "special
relationship" between her and the individual defendants. (Cross-Respt's Br. at 38.) However,
the "special relationship" to which Donna refers pertains to "...claims for personal services
provided by professionals..." (Cross-Respt's Br. at 38); Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140
Idaho 702, 710, 99 P.3d 1092, 1100 (Ct. App. 2004). In the alternative, Donna argues that
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there existed a "unique circumstance" under which her negligence claim should not be barred
by the economic loss rule. (Cross-Respt's Br. at 38.) In order for the unique circumstances
exception to apply, those circumstances must merit a reallocation of risk. Bland v. Richard.
B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 302, 108 P.3d 996, 1002 (2005). This Court has never
addressed either exception as they pertain to corporate fiduciary duties. (Appellant's Br. at
46.)
Taking from past cases in which these exceptions were addressed, being a fiduciary
via contractual obligation or otherwise and the signing of a contract are not special or unique
circumstances that would allow her negligence claim to survive the economic loss rule. This
Court determined that there only 2 instances in which a special relationship is merited in
relation to the economic loss rule: (1) in the case of a professional or quasi-professional
performing a personal service AlcAlvain v General Ins. Co. of America, 97 Idaho 777, 554
P.2d 955 (1976) or (2) where an entity holds itself out to the public as being an expert in a
specialized function. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Assoc., 126 Idaho 1002, 895 P.2d
1195 (1995). In this case, the individual defendants were not professionals providing a personal
service to Donna nor were they entities holding themselves out as experts. As such, Donna's
negligence claim for breach of fiduciary duties does not survive the economic loss rule.
v.

Donna's inconsistent arguments have a place in a Federal
Derivative action, not a direct action.

Fifth, Donna argues that she may pursue a direct action rather than a derivative
action because she is a Series A Preferred Shareholder in AIA. (Appellant's Br. at 49.)
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Donna then admits that there is no such precedent in Idaho. (Appellant's Br. at 49, footnote
26.) In Idaho, a minority shareholder may bring a direct action if: the shareholder alleges
harm distinct from that suffered by other shareholders or that the defendants owed that
shareholder a special duty. McCann v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809, 275 P.3d 824 (2011).
However, in this case, on multiple occasions, Donna argues that the individual defendants
banned all shareholders, not just her. Additionally, Donna contends that her rights as a
shareholder are preserved. (Cross-Respt's Br. at 39.) However, it seems as though Donna
contends that she has befallen specific harm distinct from other shareholders while
maintaining that she is a shareholder who has been harmed like all the other shareholders
in AIA. As such, Donna's inconsistent positions show that she is not alleging harm distinct
to her but rather, harm that all MA shareholders have suffered and as a result, should
pursue her claims in a federal derivative action.
C. The Defendants should be awarded fees and costs.
The Defendants maintain that they should be awarded fees based on Donna's
ceaseless litigation in regard to her claims. (Respt's Br. at 40-41.) Donna seems to feel
as though she should be able to file or be involved in lawsuit after lawsuit against the
Defendants and the Defendants should be disallowed a response to those suits because, while
she has yet to prove any of the assertions she makes, the responses by the Defendants are
"frivolous." (Cross-Respt's Br. at 40.) Obviously, this is neither a logical nor well-reasoned
approach to the appellate process and being "...convinced that [Donna] she should be awarded
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fees... is not a legal basis for the awarding of such. Further, this appeal concerns the number
of shares in AIA Donna has currently remaining in her possession and at what inter est rate
those shares need to be redeemed. (Respt's Br. at 1-41.) Simply arguing that Donna should be
paid over $400,000 because a self-serving "expert" was hired to say so is also not grounds to
award Donna legal fees. (Cross-Respt's Br. at 40.) Moreover, it was Donna who filed this
appeal, not AIA; it is counter-intuitive that AIA should pay Donna for "...still having to
litigate these cases." (Appellant's Br. 1-56; Cross-Respt's Br. at 40.)
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully request that this Court affirm the dismissal of the contract
claim against AIA in CV 13-01075; affirm the dismissal of Donna's claims for fraud and aiding
and abetting fraud in CV 08-01150; affirm the dismissal of Donna's claims for unjust
enrichment in both cases; reverse the dismissal of AIA's counterclaim for breach of contract in
CV 13-01075; and awards attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of February, 2018.

Martin Martelle
Attorney for Respondents
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